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“Bodily space can be distinguished from external space and evelops its parts…”
“the body scheme is finally a way of stating my body is in the world”
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
The Phenomenology of Perception
It seems strange to me that as a species we would have been as successful as we have without the capacity to cooperate. In fact cooperation has been attributed as one of the main causes of our success. And an almost unique feature of our physiology, the size of our frontal cortex, has been related to the dynamics of our social groups. We don’t just have complex social structures; there are dense social dynamics amongst groups within larger social groups that have their own dynamics. The frontal cortex is responsible for a number of unique features of our behavior, a part of which includes our ability to inhibit it. Organized society would be impossible without the inhibitory mechanisms of the frontal lobes.
In addition we are ‘designed’ in such a way that we can recognize 200 people well enough to engage with them meaningfully. This seems to stand in contradistinction to the size and complexity of the groups we live in. Living in a city we come across far more people day to day that we are ‘designed’, as a species to have integrated relations with. Think about some of the largest institutions in society. There are functioning bodies of significantly more people than 200; all cooperating within themselves well enough for those institutions to survive.
This is in part dependent on our theory of mind which enables us to have sophisticated beliefs about other peoples beliefs’. On the one hand this increases our competitive advantage within society. On the other hand it demonstrates the extent to which we have evolved an innate intentionality that involves other people at the forefront of our consciousness.
At each level of the milieu of society are groups with their own dynamics each equally dense and complex. Wat is more we are capable of forms of thought that involve people other than ourselves that are sophisticated. If we are to accept some form of evolutionary theory we must accept that there is more to our evolution than individual competition. Sociability and cooperation are central facets of an evolved person. We have an innate capacity for social interaction in a complex environent that requires other people.
Take the form of thought ‘I know that she knows that I know what I know, which she doesn’t know‘. That requires several levels of thought only possible in a sophisticated mind evolved to manage complex interactions in a distributed group of other people.
One only need consider the possibility of language to understand the fundamental nature of our being embedded in a social context. Language would be impossible if we were not able to understand each other. This in and of itself implies the extent to which the social world is an inescapable part of the individual. The extent to which language facilities social interaction and cultural development is a singularly unique feature that is human.
But we are led to believe that we are individuals with singularly selfish genes. Competition has become one of the prevailing features, not just of evolutionary and biological science but of the social sciences too. This mode of thought is not compatible on its own with the drive to complex social systems described thus far.
It is not only a false and dangerous myth that competition stands on its own as an axiom of evolution; social, cultural and biological science has adopted the selfish gene as an explanatory concept. The associated concepts and the methodology that have led towards such a myth lie behind a difficulty we have solving some of the most intractable problems of our time.
In his 1945 masterpiece Maurice Merleau-Ponty placed our phenomenology (the structures of consciousness, and by virtue of that our minds) in the world; not just in the mind or the body of the organism. His critical insight was not just that as perceiving and conscious agents are we dependent on our bodies for the structure of our perceptions; as bodies we exist in relation to the world: our experience implies our bodies and our bodies imply the world in which they are intentional objects and situated.
In a sense a part of
our world is contained in the character of our experience, the world that we experience is then implied by us. In order that facts of experience are coherent we must be continuous with that world in which we are embodied. It is also the case that we are not singularly self serving individuals. We are embodied in a whole that extends from us into the world and of which we are a significant part. For that whole to to be understood it is not enough that we conform to it. Nor that we understand a part of it. In some sense it must also conform to us with a given reciprocity. It is in that reciprocity that we can consider the whole character of society and the mind.
In the field of Consciousness Studies one of the problems over the last decade has been the question ‘where do we identify consciousness as being‘. Some, (notably the neuroscientific community) have said that consciousness is in the brain. Advocates of this view are eager to eliminate the kind of dualism found in Descartes cogito. They want to identify consciousness with brain function only.
However, others (mainly philosophers) have pointed out that if you prick your finger you don’t feel the sensation in your brain. Irrespective of where the sensation is processed the pain remains in your finger; i.e. that is where consciousness is. In that sense consciousness can not be said to be in the brain; consciousness is where it is experienced. Advocates of these latter theories cite greater need for the inclusion of first person methodologies in the science of consciousness.
If we take the latter view as the basis of a methodology that will inform us it is quickly clear that orthodox methods don’t give the whole picture. Our language it appears is ill equipped dealing with the relation between the individual and whole. As a consequence our concepts are impoverished. A paradigm shift that could articulate the whole and the individual, or the system and its parts (simultaneously) is needed. This implies a radical shift in the set of concepts that form the basis of inquiry.
Modern inquiry is based on our ability to break down component parts of a system. We atomize phenomena in order to understand them. The atomization enables us to explain phenomena in terms of cause and effect of their smaller constituent parts. However, in the process of conducting the analysis the larger system is explained away. The explanandum is in part impoverished by the explanan in modern analysis.
This is necessary for two reasons. The first is that we make statements in which only component parts of the system are predicated in the antecedent of the statements we test. This means that the truth or falsity of the consequent conclusions are valid only for the parts we have predicated. we make an inference from these parts to a larger system, but in the process we have already lost a significant portion of what needs to be explained.
This wouldn’t be a significant problem on its own if it were not for the second part of the issues surrounding modern methodologies. We employ a method called logical reductionism in which a set of statements in (X) are explained by another set of statements in (Y) which contain statements about (X). If statements in (Y) are found to be true in (Y) we have sufficient proof of the validity of the explanation of (X) through (Y).
In other words statements about water (X) can be explained by talking about the behavior of water molecules which are contained in physics or chemistry (Y). If we know the statements of (Y) to be true (consistent) then they can be applied to our understanding of (X); we have explained water (X) through (Y).
Science is built around the coherence of sets of statements about a feature of the world. These statements imply other statements that form testable hypotheses. The testable hypotheses by their very nature do not test the whole set of statements related to the phenomena, only the parts that we can test contained in the hypothesis. Once these have been tested (and validated) the implication is that we have an explanation/description of the higher order statements of which they came from. The problem I am illustrating is that en-route we have lost a significant portion of what there is to be understood.
To take consciousness for example. Aspects of consciousness are explained by brain activity. However, in none of the explanations is consciousness required to exist in order for the statements being tested to be true (of consciousness). It would be the goal of the reductionist to explain all of the properties of consciousness by neural activity.
However, given our innate relations (R) to the social world it seem that these relations (Rn) would have to be contained in the reduction for the description to be complete. But as we don’t have the language to do that, nor the concepts required, it would be an impossible feat. The result is an impoverished view of what consciousness consists in.
The fact remains that our minds exist as a function of our bodies and as a part of the world in which they are agents. These two factors not only form a concrete and necessary part of who we are. They are a requisite feature of the consciousness that science wishes to understand. In order that it does, it will have to learn from phenomenology before the character of our experience can be fully understood. We must be able to generate a sufficient and necessary set of statements that canbe tested, but also that can form a part of our understanding of who we are and what our relationship is with the world. It is a fact of our existence that we are social and that as such we embody the world in which we exist as much as that world is a product of us.
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