
“What if language closely related to poetic diction were indispensable for a science of man…?” Medard Boss, 1954
“The intuitionist mathematician proposes to do mathematics as a free vital activity of thought. For him mathematics is a production of the human mind. He uses language,…only for communicating thoughts…Such a linguistic accompaniment is not a representation of mathematics; still less is it mathematics itself” Arend Heyting, 1964
“To think is the same as the thought that it is” Parmenides, approx 520-450 BC
Thought is thought to be identical with the brain. All mental processes and therefore the contents of consciousness, are brain processes. That is called identity theory.
Identity theory doesn’t appear to pose any real problems. In fact if anything it appears to solve a few. Unlike Berkeley's reduction of all categories to mind, identity theories pose hope for increasing our understanding of the mind through a materialist research program of the brain. Consciousness, the fundamental ’stuff’ that philosophers and scientists have tried to understand appears to be no less and no more than a distributed property of the brain or its activity, possibly an epiphenomenon, a mere consequence. In that sense the only understanding left to understanding the mind is understanding the brain.
The truth is not so convenient. The contents of consciousness don’t just include tables and chairs. Consciousness includes parts of society and culture; however one wishes to understand either society and culture, one must appreciate its existence at least. Furthermore we all respond to what we are conscious of in society. That act of appreciation requires cognizance of what it is that is appreciated. It therefore falls within the mind and a part of either is therefore contained within the contents of consciousness.
If that is true it is then true that parts of society can be explained through brain processes. Therefore, in understanding the mind a part of the phenomenology we ought to be concerned to understand includes the meaning of the world that we derive in relation to it. If we therefore want to understand our place in the world we cannot exclude from our understanding the world that is contained in experience.
However, if we do try to understand the mind only through the brain we will be in danger of excluding from understanding a large portion of what needs explanation. Formalizing the science of the mind in such a way that it is paradigmatic that the ‘meaning’ (and ‘identity’) we achieve from the world is eliminated from understanding by the act of reduction to the brain leaves out a component part of humanity: the act of formalization ossifies in our minds a paradigm that can only reinforce itself. A paradigm used to explain and understand phenomena has a certain shape (some might say a logical structure) and that shape determines legitimate and illegitimate forms of explanation (including the language that can be used to do the explaining). In identity theory the only legitimate explanations for mentality are brain processes.
The danger is that truth about the world becomes relative to the formalization. Social reality for centuries in our culture, and in every other extant culture too, has been a component part of personal identity. People just are conscious of the milieu in which they exist.
There are people in South America for example that believe their prayers hold the world in balance. They are conscious of the travails of modern life and the concomitant brutality of the modern world. The belief is not implicit. It is explicit and shared, furthermore the discrepancy between their perceptions of the modern world and their values reinforces their beliefs.
One need not believe that global warming will be put off by these peoples prayers in order that one consider the importance that this belief is shared. It is significant that for them the belief is reality, just as much as it is a reality for us that democracy is the best form of government. It is the fact that beliefs can and are explicitly shared that makes them meaningful inter-personally. One just needs to consider cases in which they aren’t shared to understand the point. Shared beliefs are not just objects of consciousness, they areschema from which the world within which we operate is interpreted. For the most part when we don’t share beliefs with someone we are faced with either adjusting our beliefs or trying to adjust the world to fit them.
What I am in effect saying is that much of what frames our minds can be identified with the world outside of our bodies, not just brain processes. To ultimately understand aspects of the mind, society & culture through the brain, we will have to situate the brain in the world. The mental world has to be seen in relation to the social world in which each persons’ mind has a stake on behalf of his or her organism. For that reason beliefs that are shared and the causes of those beliefs are important to the inquiry into the mind, it’s development and the nature of its experience.
We can quite easily conceptualize emotions, perceptions and our attention to the world through the brain without inferring the world. A description of brain processes is enough. That said, there are human concerns that are important to our understanding of consciousness. For that reason a science of human concern is needed in order to compliment the biological and physical sciences that dominate our academic biases. In effect we must understand consciousness as social and cultural too. We must shift consciousness into the world.
This would not be at all relevant if it was not for the division that Descartes made between Res Extensa and Res Cogitans. One, the physical stuff is extended and the other mental stuff has no extension according to Descartes. We still operate under this conceptual shadow today. We understand the world as that which is extended away from the mind, in front of the eyes. The mind, by being shifted to the brain is only hiding the true problem of consciousness under a blanket. By ignoring consciousness as a category that is centrally important to its own physical explanation we are paying lip service to Descartes dualism. The point has been made again and again that our conceptual framework needs to be able to include mind and brain together in order to understand both: In the words of Sayre (1976):
“If one thinks of the mind, with Descartes, as charachterized essentially by thought but as lacking extension, and thinks of the physical as thoughtless but essentially extended, then the two domains are rendered conceptually incommensurable”
This same point has been iterated several times (see Richard Rorty ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature‘, more recently Max Velmans has articulated a view that contrasts with the implicit dualism of contemporary western thought). It is only in the fringes that the water is beginning to leak through the walls of our conceptual framework. But not explicitly. Neuroscience as a discipline has linked cognition to movement and understanding the mind as essentially embodied signifies a paradigm shift that is centrally important.
If we do place the world in the mind and reciprocally, place the mind in the world, the implications for understanding a vast array of phenomena with what we already know will be immense. Phenomena as different as poetry and mathematics will have a home in the same vessel and in some sense be reducible to it. Poetry, an ancient form of human diction seen as an expression of the mind and mathematics seen as a vital language for describing the world are valid as categories of mental phenomena (albeit doing very different things). There are no ontological issues raised by seeing the entire world as conceived by our minds and relative to them.
When Wittgenstein remarked that if a lion could speak we could not understand him he made a serious point about the nature of communication. What we communicate is not only couched in language, it is created by minds to which the communication is relevant. That does not mean by any stretch that what is communicated is false. Measurement of the external world may be universal, and numbers may have different symbols on different planets, but the application of measurement is still transferable across species who use it. What concerns us here is the part that allows the measurement itself to be understood as relative to the species conducting the measurement.
In this vein of thought identity theory need not be considered false in order that it include consciousness. It’s contents as a unit relevant to its own explanation is not necessarily viciously circular. On one side of the equation may sit terms representing experienced phenomena (x) and on the other the language of materialism/physicalism (z). In my own mind it is what happens in between that allows the equivalence of the two to be understood. That is the important question that ought to be raised.
What is significant to this maneuver however, is that each set of terms are understood as relevant to each other. For the identity to work it is not just the case that the entire world is reduced to the brain, the reciprocal relation between the brain and the world has to hold also. That makes the human mind a category of the world in which it is situated as something to be understood, understood that is, as a part of a larger system that includes the entirety of human experience as a category for explanation.
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